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Sir, 
we would like to comment on the paper by Gauriot et al. [1], “Statistical challenges in the 
quantification of gunshot residue evidence”. In this paper, the authors deal with the assessment of the 
evidential value of gunshot residue (GSR) particles using a probabilistic approach. The discussion is 
partially based on graphical probability networks (i.e., Bayesian networks) inspired by previous 
literature [2], and invokes various scenarios. 
As starting point, we wish to emphasize that we are glad to see that discussions on the forensic 
interpretation of GSR particles stimulate strong interest among researchers worldwide. This topic is 
intricate and several concerns are regularly raised during meetings, while rather few works have been 
published so far. The paper by Gauriot et al. contributes to move discussions ahead by raising 
questions regarding the general understanding of aspects that affect the coherent evaluation of results 
of GSR analyses. However, we do not fully agree with all the points addressed by the authors. We 
would like to revisit some of their conclusions and discuss two points in particular: first, the choice 
of propositions of interest in a GSR-related case, and second, the difference between subjectivity and 
arbitrariness. The viewpoint that we seek to justify is that none of these two points represents a 
drawback for probabilistic approaches to GSR interpretation, contrary to what might be understood 
from Gauriot et al.’s discourse. 
Our first point relates to the definition of propositions of interest and is crucial for the application of 
probabilistic approaches in any field of forensic science, not only GSR-analysis. It is a subtle step 
and should be faced with utmost care. It is widely accepted that at least two competing propositions 
must be considered: one for the prosecution and one for the defence [3]. In previous works on the 
evaluation of GSR particles [2, 4], propositions of the following kind were used as an example: 
Hp: the suspect has discharged a firearm;  
Hd: the suspect has not discharged a firearm. 
Although it is clear that the simple negation of the first proposition is rarely a helpful alternative 
(because one may ask what else ‘happened’ if Hp is not the case), the generality of the discussion 
supposed that, in an actual case at hand, the proposition Hd will be further specified in order to enable 
the scientist to assess probabilities for outcomes given Hd. Note that, without an explicit alternative 
scenario under Hd it may be difficult to assign probabilities for outcomes in a defensible way. We 
will come back to this issue in due course. 
Gauriot et al. initially adopt the same pair of propositions as mentioned above. However, they 
consider that these propositions do not allow the scientist to take into account the wide range of 
possible scenarios and, thus, they argue that other hypotheses should be considered. For example, the 
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defence may consider that the suspect has not discharged a firearm, but he was standing next to the 
shooter, or touched a GSR-contaminated surface (e.g., the victim or a spent cartridge). To bridge this 
gap, the authors propose propositions such as “the suspect was or was not contaminated by standing 
near the shooter” and “the suspect was or was not contaminated by touching a GSR-contaminated 
surface” (p. 1152). On first sight, such propositions undoubtedly appear intuitively attractive, 
essentially because they provide a full account of the findings. That is, as their name says, they explain 
the scientist’s findings. On close inspection, however, we must realise that they provide no guidance 
to a jury. The reason for this is that, generally, the probability of the findings given an explanation is 
the same, or about the same, as that given the first proposition, so that the resulting likelihood ratio is 
one. This is why such propositions have been recognised as ‘explanations’, that is allegations that 
explain the findings but that do not enable the strength of findings to be assessed [5]. 
The problem with the explanations invoked above is not that they suggest an alternative activity such 
as standing nearby or touching a surface. The complication arises from the fact of factoring 
observations into the explanations, in particular the expression ‘was contaminated’. To illustrate that 
this observation-driven feature should not be part of the propositions, consider the case of the smash 
of a window where the suspect argues that he is not the breaker, but was standing nearby. In such a 
case, the denominator of the likelihood ratio represents the probability of the findings (which may be 
no glass) assuming that the suspect is not the breaker, but a bystander. This will require the scientist 
to assess the probability of the findings given additional uncertain events of transfer and no transfer 
as a non-smashing bystander. This is the same logic of reasoning as used for the numerator where the 
findings are assessed under the proposition that the suspect is the breaker, with an extension to 
additional conditioning events of transfer and no transfer [6]. Stated otherwise, invoking the 
alternative proposition that the suspect did not commit the activity alleged by the first proposition, 
but was standing close while it was committed by someone else (the true offender) does not mean 
that necessarily transfer occurred. Transfer is an uncertain event both under the first and the second 
proposition and its probability needs to be assigned depending on the framework of circumstantial 
information (e.g., [6]). 
This is not to doubt that, in real cases, the primary use of a firearm is often not the only possible 
source of GSR-like particles on a suspect’s hands. Indeed, contamination effects due to proximity to 
a discharging firearm or handling GSR-contaminated surfaces are well known and documented. 
Several studies regarding this problem are reported in the literature [7-9]. It should be noted, however, 
that during an evaluative stage (as opposed to an investigative stage) of a firearm-related crime, the 
principal interest of competing parties at trial is the role (i.e., activity) of an accused in a well-defined 
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event. Thus, when evaluating results of GSR analyses, propositions should reflect this exigency 
appropriately. That is, propositions should clearly state what the suspect allegedly did and did not do. 
Additional special circumstances are part of the conditioning information. Most importantly, it should 
be reminded that meaningful and operationally helpful propositions are defined within the framework 
of circumstances as given by the non-scientific evidence in a case as it has been presented to the 
scientist [5]. 
Explanation-based reporting is predominant in current practice. Indeed, most forensic laboratories 
report the detection of GSR particles on hands of a suspect using statements ascertaining the extent 
of compatibility of those particles with the direct use of a weapon or contamination due to proximity 
to a discharging firearm or handling GSR-contaminated surfaces (see Schwoeble & Exline [7] for 
some examples of suggested conclusions). Usually, this approach offers no discrimination between 
such explanations, which is in agreement with the well-accepted view among practitioners that the 
sole count of GSR particles collected on hands does rarely allow one to arrive at conclusions that are 
in some way discriminative. This, however, is due to an inherent limitation of the nature of the 
evidence itself, and not the result of a weakness of the interpretative models. In fact, previous 
literature about the application of probabilistic approaches to GSR evidence never claimed to 
overcome this situation. On the contrary, probabilistic evaluative procedures actually provide a 
rationale for the limited discriminative capacity. In particular, they help to logically structure the 
reasoning procedure, and enhance the crucial understanding of, for example, the differences between 
propositions and explications.  
This is a first step towards an interpretation of evidence that may be more helpful for the judicial 
system. Indeed, conclusions using explanations offers no guidance to the Court as to how it ought to 
revise its view regarding the various competing scenarios: the presence of any particles is ‘explained’ 
away by alternative activities. For example, when finding particles the suggestion is that this does not 
necessarily mean that the suspect discharged the firearm, while any absence of particles is said not to 
be incompatible with the discharge of a firearm (i.e., no particles may be found even though the 
suspect discharged a firearm). Inherent in such statements is the well-known, and widely banned, 
confusing expression ‘consistent with’ [3].  
The above impasse is inherent to the investigative perspective that starts by looking at the findings to 
produce potential explanations. This is different for the evaluative perspective where the propositions 
are formed prior to looking at the findings, based on the agreed background of non-scientific 
information, and where any results are subsequently assessed with respect to the existing propositions. 
The difference between these two settings is fundamental and worthy to be reemphasized: the former 
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(investigation) is about asking ‘what are the potential explanations for my findings?’ whereas the 
latter (evaluation) is about asking ‘if these are my views about the case prior to considering the 
evidence, based on the non-scientific evidence, how ought these views be modified in the light of the 
findings?’. Only the latter leads to an expression of the strength of the evidence, positive, negative or 
neutral, as the case may be. 
More generally, it should also be noted that consideration of further analytical items of information, 
other that the simple count of GSR-like particles, could help reduce the number of situations where 
findings offer limited discriminative capacity. Intrinsic particle features such as particle composition 
and population distribution are still rarely taken into account. For example, compatibility with 
reference material could lead to more substantial weights of evidence under activity-level 
propositions, in either direction. Future works on this should thus be encouraged. 
Another matter of concern pointed out by Gauriot et al. is the claim that the choices (referred to as 
‘subjective’) made by the forensic expert in building a statistical model and assigning probabilities 
lead to an inevitable degree of arbitrariness in the conclusions. Regarding this observation, it is useful 
to emphasise the difference between the terms “arbitrary” and “subjective”. As a matter of general 
understanding, one could term “arbitrary” a judgement that is based solely on random choice or 
personal whim. In contrast to this, a “subjective” judgement is typically understood as one that is 
based on (or influenced by) personal feelings, tastes or opinions. The distinction between the two thus 
relies on how the particular judgement is formed. When it is based on no knowledge of the problem 
under study (or in intentional ignorance of relevant knowledge), then it is arbitrary. In turn, if it is 
based on previous experience or learning, then it is subjective in the sense of ‘personal’. Stated 
otherwise, a subjective judgement is an opinion conditioned on and informed by relevant acquired 
information on the considered topic, while an arbitrary judgement is merely a random unjustified 
choice. These definitions are mutually exclusive, in the sense that a genuinely subjective judgement 
is not arbitrary and vice-versa. Thus, if it is said that the conclusions of scientists depend on various 
component assignments, this does not mean that the overall conclusion is arbitrary. It solely means 
that the conclusion translates the knowledge of the individual who issues the statement of interest. 
Different people can have different opinions about the same issue, which translates different states of 
knowledge.  
Generally in science, including forensic science, models are necessarily subjective because, as noted 
for example by Lindley [10], every inferential model cannot be anything other than an approximation 
to the complexities of the real world, and judgement to decide how to model a phenomenon is 
necessarily personal. As anticipated above, different persons have different (personal) backgrounds, 
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which may lead them to give more or less importance to target variables that compose a problem. 
They may provide different appreciations of dependencies between variables. This should not, 
however, be a cause for concern [11]. In particular, it does not indicate a ‘problem’ with the theory 
(of probability). It actually shows that the framework is capable to capture intersubjective differences. 
This perception also applies to assignments for the unknown parameters that are employed in 
probabilistic models. As each evaluator has access to different datasets and records, it is natural to 
see that the values chosen by scientists vary inter-individually. Notwithstanding, it may be that 
scientist can agree on at least a range of inter-subjective agreement.  
In forensic science at large, an additional difficulty stems from the fact that each case is distinct in its 
own right, and perpetrated in conditions which may be hard to reproduce or approximate (because of 
the nature of the crime itself, or because some of this conditions are actually unknown) [12]. Thus, 
scientists are often called to exert their personal judgement, based on their personal scientific 
knowledge and documented competence in the particular area of specialisation. This situation was 
also accepted by the ENFSI best practice manual [13], where Section 9.1.1. states: “[…] there will 
rarely be any situation where all the information requirements are met, and the quality of what 
information is available may be very varied. So, there will always be an element of subjectivity in 
how this is used and what weight should be attached to the different aspects.” 
The fact that some extent of divergence in individual assignments may exist does not mean that 
conclusions arrived at through a particular model are necessarily ‘invalid’. The best that scientists 
can do is to ensure that a model structure and adopted probability assignments are justified by their 
background knowledge. Subsequent probability calculus will only claim to ensure coherence in the 
manipulation of probabilities already assigned within the specified model. On this point, see also 
Lindley [10]: “There are therefore two aspects to our study: the construction of the model and the 
analysis of that model. The latter is essentially automatic; in principle it can be done on a machine. 
The former requires close contact with reality. To paraphrase and exaggerate de Finetti, think when 
constructing the model; with it, do not think but leave it to the computer.” (p. 303) 
For the purpose of illustration, let us reconsider the effect of considerations about the background 
presence of particles on the likelihood ratio as discussed in the paper of Gauriot et al. As mentioned 
above, belief in the occurrence of any kind of contamination in a particular case is a subjective 
judgement that should be evaluated with respect to the available circumstantial information. 
Arguably, it will be uncontroversial that the scientists’ knowledge about the context, in particular 
characteristics of the suspect (e.g., his habits, professional activity, etc.), will shape their probability 
assignments for events of “high” or “low” levels of contamination. For example, if the suspect is 
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known to be a regular sport shooter, a scientist may be entitled to retain higher beliefs in the event of 
a high level of background, than in a case where the suspect is a sedentary person. Such an assignment 
is neither arbitrary nor ambiguous. If stated sincerely, these beliefs reflect the scientist’s current 
knowledge of the framework of circumstances as it was presented and it is weighted by the scientist’s 
experience in the domain. The latter condition constitutes a fundamental point. In fact, GSR-
experimented scientists would take into account contextual information on the basis of their 
documented learning about the factors which could influence background levels. Thus, the final 
judgement is not a matter of random choice (i.e., arbitrary), but an informed scientific opinion.  
From our point of view, Gauriot at al.’s paper leaves the impression that there is a problem with 
probabilistic models, and hence with probability in general, for the assessment of GSR analyses. We 
concede that the application of probabilistic analyses to real world problems may indeed be 
challenging, but is this the ‘fault’ of probability? We do not think so because probability theory itself 
says nothing about how it ought to be applied. Instead we believe that the real difficulty lies in the 
world that surrounds us. Probability only claims to ensure a coherent processing of beliefs according 
to a structure that is defined by the scientist. Thus, the matter of sound use of probability rests 
essentially upon the efforts deployed by the scientist.  
Today we have innovative approaches – such as Bayesian networks – that allow us to construct 
probabilistic models at unprecedented levels of complexity. Rather than running these aids down we 
should emphasise that never before we have been in a better position to bring probability to fruitful 
applications, both in forensic science and beyond. The very fact that such models may point out that 
conclusions may be sensible to input assignments shows where further research in probability 
elicitation is imperative. 
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